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False bad news about population, resources, and environment is
rampant despite upbeat evidence.
The author is Professor of Economics and Business Administration
at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, 61801.
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Fact ; This widely-reported "index" is, according to the National
Wildlife Federation which prepares and disseminates it, "a subjective
analysis . . . judgment [which] represents collective thinking of the
editors of the National Wildlife Federation Staff." That is, the EQI
represents casual observation rather than hard statistical facts. It
includes such subjective judgments as that the trend of "living space" is
"down . . . vast stretches of America are lost to development yearly." (42)
Yet the objective statistical facts indicate that the environment
is getting better. Earlier we saw that "living space" is not declining,
and recreational areas are increasing rapidly. The official Council on
Environmental Quality's data on major air pollutants show sharp improve-
ments in the last decade (Figure 13). With respect to water, "major
improvements in the quality of polluted streams have been documented"
with hard data, says the Council. (43) (See Figure 14.) The fish catch
in Lake Erie, long ago said to be "dead" by Barry Commoner, has been
increasing. The most important indicator of environmental quality is
life expectancy; it continues to rise—and at increasing rate: a gain
of 2.1 years from 1970-1976, compared to a gain of only 0.8 years in the
entire decade of the 1960 's. (44)
Statement : Increased population density leads to psychological
and social pathology.
Fact : The statement is sheer myth, based on faulty analogies to
animal behavior. Social surveys show that density has no general ill
effects on such measures of welfare as longevity of life, crime rate,,
mental illness rates, and recreational facilities. (45)
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Summary
:
False bad news about population growth, natural resources, and the environment
is published widely in the face of solid contradictory evidence. For example,
the world supply of arable land has been increasing, the scarcity of natural
resources including food and energy has been decreasing, and basic measures
of U.S. environmental quality have positive trends. The aggregate data show
no long run negative effect of population growth upon the standard of living,
and my models that embody forces omitted In the past — especially the influence
of population size upon productivity increase — suggest a long run positive
effect. There are various possible reasons why the false bad news dominates
the true good news. Personal values are certainly a key factor.
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THE ONLY IMPENDING SHORTAGE
IS A SHORTAGE OF BAD NEWS
Julian L. Simon
Newsweek
,
September 19, 1977: "[M]ore than 100,000 West Africans
perished of hunger" in the Sahel between 1968 and 1973 due to drought.
Upon inquiry, writer Peter Gwynne informed me that the estimate came
from Kurt Waldheim's message to the United Nations' Desertification
Conference. I therefore wrote to Waldheim asking for the source of
the estimate.
Three mutually contradictory documents came back from the United
Nations' Public Inquiries Unit: (1) Waldheim's message, saying, "Who
can forget the horror of millions of men, women and children starving,
with more than 100,00 dying, because of an ecological calamity that
turned grazing land and farms into bleak desert?" (2) A two-page ex-
cerpt from a memo by the UN Sahelian Office, dated November 8, 1974,
saying, "[I]t is not possible to calculate the present and future
impact of this tragedy, on the populations. . .Although precise figures
are not available, indeed unobtainable. . .certainly there has been an
extensive and tragic loss of life...". (3) Making nonsense of the other
two documents was one page by Helen Ware, a respected Australian expert
on African demography and a visiting fellow at the University of Ibadan
in March, 1975, when the memo was written specifically for the UN.
Based on calculations of the normal death rate for the area, together
with "the highest death rate in any group of nomads" during the drought,
she figured that "At an absolute, and most improbable, upper limit a
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hundred thousand. . .Even as a maximum [this estimate] represents an
unreal limit." (Ware's private reaction is: "The problem with deaths
in the Sahel is precisely that there was so little evidence of them
—
rather like the photograph of the dead cow which kept turning up in
illustration to every newspaper story.) (1)
To repeat, Ware's statement, which flatly contradicts Waldheim's
well-publicized assessment, was on page one of a document written for the
UN, well before the UN Desertification Conference and Waldheim's message.
Apparently, it was the only calculation the UN had. But it was totally
ignored.
More recently, the UN press releases have retreated to the more
modest—but assertion that "tens of thousands" died. (2) But even this
assertion is undocumented and of doubtful propriety. A recent summary
of the scientific evidence on the drought's effects by John Caldwell
—
a leading demographer of Africa who was familiar with the area prior
to the drought, and spent 1973 there—found: " [0]ne cannot certainly
identify the existence of the drought in the vital statistics. . .nutri-
tional levels, although poor, were similar to those found before the
drought in other parts of Africa. The only possible exception was that
of very young children." (3)
This is just one example of a common phenomenon: False bad news
about population growth, natural resources, and the environment, based
on flimsy evidence or no evidence at all, is published widely in the
face of solid, contradictory evidence, as I shall show in this article.
Another example comes from the same Newsweek piece: "More than
one-third of all the land is desert or near-desert. And deserts are
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spreading inexorably, turning arable land into stony waste or heaps of
drifting sand. . .annually destroying twelve million to seventeen million
acres." The headline on the front-page story in the New York Times said,
"14 Million Acres a Year Vanishing as Deserts Spread Around Globe." (4)
Some arable areas surely are deteriorating. But these news stories
—
probably originating from the book Losing Ground (5) by Erik Eckholm of
WorldWatch Institute—clearly imply a more general proposition: that the
world's supply of arable land is decreasing. And the truth is exactly
the opposite: Joginder Kumar made a careful, country-by-country survey
of the changes in arable land from 1950 to 1960. (6) His finding: There
was nine percent more total arable land in 1960 than in 1950, in the 87
countries for which he could find data (accounting for 73 percent of the
total world land area)—a gain of almost one percent per year (Columns
1 and 2 of Table 1). And the more recent FAO data show a rise in "arable
and permanent cropland" from 1,403 to 1,507 million hectares in the world
as a whole from 1961-65 to 1974, an annual increase of .7 percent for the
roughly-eleven year period. In the developing countries the area increased
by 1.1 percent annually over the 1960-1970 decade. (7)
(
The increase in the quantity of land that is cultivated rose even
faster than 1 percent per year—from 8.9 percent of the total area to
9.9 percent during 1950-1960 (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). And the in-
crease in effective crop area was greater yet, because of the increase
in multiple cropping in Asia and elsewhere. In some places the extension
of cultivation has caused decreased quality of land, of course; but in
other places the process has improved the quality of land.
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But does not a larger population necessarily mean "more pressure"
on the land, until each of us is nightmarishly scratching out three
skimpy meals from 18 hours of work a day, on a plot the size of a window
box? This is indeed an accurate description of the trend in countries
that have not yet entered into modernization and industrialization.
Stys (8) and Myers (9) have shown, for example, how farm size declined
in Poland and China as their populations increased from 1787 to 1937,
and from 1870 to 1930, respectively.
But hard as it may be to believe, the more general trend points
in the opposite direction. In all the higher-income industrialized,
developed countries in Europe and North America, as well as Japan, a
smaller absolute (not just relative , but absolute ) number of farmers are
producing much more food and feeding much larger total populations than
in the past. An extrapolation of this benign trend, carried to the same
absurdity as the nightmare above, would suggest that eventually one
person will be farming all of the US cropland and feeding everyone else.
The less-developed countries have not begun this trend, though the
relative proportions of the populations that are in agriculture are
falling rapidly in those poor countries. As they get richer, we can
expect those countries to show the same trend—smaller absolute numbers
of persons doing the farming for larger populations, on ever-larger
farm units.
SOME OTHER MYTHS ABOUT POPULATION AND RESOURCES
Here are some other examples of publicized, false, bad news and the
unpublicized, good-news truth:
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Statement : The food situation in less-developed countries is worsen-
ing. "Serious World Food Gap Is Seen Over the Long Run..." is the typi-
cal New York Times headline. Children's textbooks repeat the Malthusian
proposition bluntly and unequivocally.
[Papulations increase geometrically—that is, they
double (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc.). Food supplies, in
contrast, increase only arithmetically, a much slower
process (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, etc.)....
If the population continues to explode, many people
will starve. About half of the world's population is
underfed now, with many approaching starvation. (10)
The Environmental Fund paid for a full-page advertisement in leading
newspapers, signed by such dignitaries as author Isaac Asimov, now-
Presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, author Malcolm Cowley,
ecologist Paul Ehrlich, editor Clifton Fadiman, oilman J. Paul Getty,
Time Inc. executive Henry Luce, poet Archibald MacLeish, Nobel prize
winner Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Reader's Digest founder DeWitt Wallace,
UAW President Leonard Woodcock, and many others, saying:
The world as we know it will likely be ruined be-
fore the year 2,000 and the reason for this will
be its inhabitants' failure to comprehend two facts.
These facts are:
1. World food production cannot keep pace with
the galloping growth of population.
2. "Family planning" cannot and will not, in
the foreseeable future, check this runaway
growth. (11)
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The School of Public Affairs of Princeton offers a course on "Problems
of World Hunger" based on the premise that "Hunger .. .has never been
known on such a world-wide scale as today." (12) Perhaps most influential
was Paul Ehrlich's best-selling book, The Population Bomb . The first
lines were: "The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970's
the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people are going
to starve to death." (13)
Many writers view the situation as so threatening that they call
for strong measures to restrict population growth: "[Cjompulsion if
voluntary methods fail," as Ehrlich put it. (14) Some, such as the 1967
book, Famine-1975! , find in these assertions the warrant for such policies
as "triage—letting the least fit die in order to save the more robust
victims of hunger. (15) ...My own opinion as the triage classification
of these sample nations is:
Haiti Can' t-be-saved
Egypt Can' t-be-saved
The Gambia Walking Wounded
Tunisia Should Receive Food
Libya Walking Wounded
India Can' t-be-saved
Pakistan Should Receive Food" (16)
Fact : Per-capita food production has been increasing at roughly
one percent yearly—25 percent during the last quarter century. Even
in less developed countries food production has increased substantially
(see Table 2) . World food stocks are high now, and even India has large
amounts of food in storage.
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Individual countries have done far worse than the average, and even
had declining production, some because of war or political upheaval.
And progress in food production has not been steady. But there has
been no year, or series of years, so bad as to support a conclusion of
long-term retrogression. I emphasize this because I am now writing at
a time (October, 1978) when harvests have been particularly good. Last
year and again this year the headlines say "Corn, bean yields again
set records," "Wheat— there's too much despite drought, deluge," and
"World food supplies are just below record level." Grain prices have
fallen so sharply that U.S. farmers are again complaining of disaster
—
from too much food. Some readers might wonder whether my assertions are
overly influenced by recent events. But the first draft of this material,
for publication in my technical book, (17) was written in 1971 and 1972,
when food production was having its worst time in recent decades.
People sometimes ask: "What about the data the other fellows quote
to support their worried forecasts?" In simple fact there are no other
basic data . The data shown in Table 2 were published by the UN, collected
from the individual countries. Of course the data are far less reliable
then one would like; economic data usually are. But these are the only
"official" data, and no one quotes any other data because data that would
show a worsening trend in recent decades simply do not exist.
Statement : The danger of famine is increasing. The UN Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific predicts "500 million star-
vation deaths in Asia between 1980 and 2025." (18)
Fact : The course of famines is difficult to measure quantitatively.
But a leading agricultural economist who has studied the history of famines
intensively, Gale Johnson, estimates that since World War II there has been
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a "dramatic decline" in famines. Only a tenth as many people died of
famine in the third quarter of the 20th century as in the last quarter
of the 19th century—despite the much larger population now. (19)
A key cause of the decline in famine deaths has been the improve-
ments in road systems, which allow food to be moved from regions of plenty
to regions of shortage. The road-system improvements are themselves
a product of increased population density (20) as well as of improvements
in technology.
Statement ; Higher population growth implies lower per-capita
economic growth. This is gospel for the World Bank, the U.S. State
Department's AID, and other international development agencies.
Fact ; Empirical studies by Nobel-prize winner Simon Kuznets and
others show no statistical correlation between countries' population
growth and their per-capita economic growth, either over the long run
or in recent decades.
Figures la and lb show decadal growth rates of population and out-
put per capita for those countries where long-run data are available.
No strong relationship appears. Contemporary cross-national comparisons
of current rates of population growth and economic growth are another
source of evidence. Many such studies have been done by now, and they
agree that population growth does not have a negative effect upon economic
growth in either more-developed or less-developed countries. (21)
These overlapping empirical studies do not show that fast popula-
tion growth increases per capita income. But they certainly imply
that one should not confidently assert that population growth decreases
economic growth.
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Statement : Sophisticated computer models show that for the next
thirty years an increase in population causes a decrease in per capita
income.
Phyllis Piotrow (24) documented the decisive impact upon the late-
1960's policy of USAID and the UN's FPA that was exerted by the first of
these models, created in 1958 by Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover. (25) Largely
founded on the Coale-Hoover simulation, the belief that population growth
in less-developed countries is bad for the world led the State Department
to greatly increase its spending for fertility reduction in poor coun-
tries, hand-in-hand with relatively lower spending on international death
reduction and other health programs, as seen in Table 3. (26) Along with
the hundreds of millions of dollars for fertility reduction, the U.S. has
put pressure on foreign governments to adopt fertility reduction programs.
Fact ; At the heart of all these models is simply an arithmetical
truth: When there is one more child sharing the same amount of goods,
there is less to go around. As Wilfred Beckerman remarked, the instant
a calf is born, per-capita income and wealth go up, but the second a
child is born, per-capita income and wealth go down. This truth was well
recognized by Coale and Hoover: "The inauspicious showing of the high-
fertility case... in levels of living is traceable entirely to the acceler-
ated growth in the number of consumers." The point was crystal-clear to
Malthus even without a complex model. He noted that an increase in
population "increases the number of people before the means of subsis-
tence are increased. The food therefore which before supported eleven
millions, must now be divided among eleven millions and a half." (27)
Once the children grow up, however, and become producers as well
as consumers, the impact on per-capita income reverses. Eventually the

Julian L. Simon
11
income of other people is higher because of the additional children, as
my own technical work has shown. But this takes more than the 25 or 30
years covered by the well-known models.
The main new element in my model for more-developed countries
(MDC's) is the contribution of additional people to increasing produc-
tivity. (28) This occurs partly through larger markets and economies of
scale. But more important are an additional person's contributions to
increased knowledge and technical progress. People bring not only
mouths and hands into the world, but also heads and minds, too. That
is, the source of improvements in productivity is the human mind, and
the human mind is seldom found apart from the human body. This is an
old idea, going back at least as far as William Petty in 1682:
"As for the Arts of Delight and Ornament, they are
best promoted by the greatest number of emulators.
And it is more likely that one ingenious curious
man may rather be found among 4 million than 400
persons .. .And for the propagation and improvement
of useful learning, the same may be said concerning
it as above-said concerning. .. the Arts of Delight
and Ornaments..." (29)
Instead of population growth and productivity increases being independent
forces running a "race", additional persons cause technological advances
by inventing, adapting, and diffusing new productive knowledge.
Technical progress—which is the main source of long-run economic
growth in MDC's—arises partly from organized scientific R&D, and
partly from people who are not especially educated and do not work in
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science— the taxi dispatcher who develops a slightly better way of deploying
his ten-taxi fleet, the supermarket manager who finds a way to display more
merchandise in a given space, the supermarket clerk who finds a quicker
way to stamp the prices on cans, the market researcher who experiments
to find more efficient and cheaper means of advertising the store's prices
and sale items, and so on. This is the "learning by doing" phenomenon
which has been all-important in raising our standard of living from what
it was 20 years ago, 200 years ago, 20,000 years ago, to what it is now.
The aggregate economic importance of the technological knowledge factor
has clearly emerged in two well-known studies, one by Robert Solow and
the other by Edward Denison. (30)
I have added this effect of additional people in productivity to
a standard economic model in two different ways, as seen in Figure 2.
The result is that instead of additional persons being a permanent drag,
they lead to an increase in per-worker output starting 30-70 years after
birth— that is, 10-50 years after entry into labor force. This positive
outcome of added persons means that economics can be a cheerful science
rather than the dismal science Malthus thought it to be.
Babies don't create knowledge and improve productivity while still
in their cradles. And though the family bears most of the cost, society
must also unpurse to bring the baby to productive adulthood. This
means that if you do not look as far as the next twenty-five years, the
knowledge benefits of someone else's baby born today do not interest
you, and that baby is therefore a poor social investment for your taxes.
d
But if you feel some interest in ,an/obligation for, the longer-run future
—
perhaps because you yourself are today enjoying the fruits of the invest-
ment that someone paid for 25 or 50 or 100 years ago, or because you have
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children whose future is important to you— then the knowledge produced
by today's children will be seen by you to be of great positive benefit
to you. (31)
The mechanism is different in less-developed countries (LDC's).
Offsetting the negative capital-dilution effects of more people, there
are positive effects through increased work done by parents, extra
stimulus to agricultural and industrial investment, increased social
infra-structure, and other economies of scale. When all these forces
are combined into my LDC simulation model, an additional child comes
to have a positive effect on the general standard of living after the
better part of a century. But the positive effect then comes to be
much larger than the negative effect early on. (32) Once again, most
of the cost is borne by the immediate family rather than the rest of the
society. And the immediate family apparently feels that the benefits
from the additional child outweigh the costs in the early years.
In short, economic theory that includes key elements left out of
previous models, together with the empirical data, suggests that additional
children have positive long-run effects upon the standard of living.
It is true that the long run— 30 to 80 years—is far from now,
and therefore is of less importance to us than is the short run. But
our long run will be someone's else's short run, just as our short run
was someone's else's long run. Some measure of unselfishness should
impel us to keep this in mind as we make our decisions about population
policy.
Statement ; Urban sprawl is paving over the United States, includ-
ing much "prime agricultural land" and recreational areas.
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Fact : All the land used for urban areas plus roadways totals less
than 3 percent of the United States area. And the increase over the
half century starting in 1920 was only a fortieth of a percent of total
land annually. (33) The United States Department of Agriculture says:
"...we are in no danger of running out of farmland." (34)
More new crop land is being created in the U.S.—1.25 million
acres are converted to efficient crop land each year, from drained swamps
and irrigated deserts— than the .9 million acres of land converted to
urban and transportation use. The rest of the 2.2 million acres of rural
land which goes out of use yearly is abandoned not because of "paving
over" but because it has "low soil fertility and a terrain unsuited to
efficient use of modern machinery." (35) A million acres yearly goes
into wilderness recreation acres and wildlife refuges, and another 300,000
acres goes for reservoirs and flood control. (36) The danger to agricul-
ture from "paving over" is another bogeyman.
About wildlife areas, state and national parks: the area rose
from eight million acres in 1920 to 73 million acres in 1974, and is
still rising. (37) The number of people who visit these recreation areas
has risen sharply due to improved transportation and increased income.
In the 1946-1960 period, for example, visits increased from 780 to 2184
per thousand people.
Statement : We are running out of natural resources and raw mate-
rials. "Entering an age of scarcity" is such a commonplace that it
is simply assumed and asserted in public discussion by people ranging
from B. F. Skinner to Solzenitsyn. (38)
Fact : The only meaningful measure of scarcity in peactime is
the cost of the good. (39) And the cost trends of almost every natural
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resource—whether measured in labor time required to produce the energy,
in production costs, in the proportion of our incomes spent for energy,
or even the price relative to other consumer goods—have been downward
over the course of recorded history.
The prices of copper (a representative and important metal), wheat
(as representative of food prices), and oil, relative to wages, are
shown in Figures 3-5. An hour's work in the U.S. has bought increasingly
more of these raw materials from 1800 to the present. And the same trend
has almost surely held throughout human history. Calculations of expendi-
tures for raw materials as a proportion of total family budgets make the
same point even more strongly. These trends imply that the raw materials
have been getting increasingly available and less scarce relative to the
most important and most fundamental element of life, human work time.
The prices of raw materials have even been falling relative to
consumer goods and the Consumer Price Index, as can be seen in Figures
6-8. All the items in the Consumer Price Index have been produced with
increasing efficiency in terms of labor and capital over the years. But
figures 6-8 show that the decrease in cost of raw materials has been
even greater than that of other goods , a very strong demonstration of
progressively decreasing scarcity and increasing availability of raw
materials.
The relative fall in the prices of raw materials understates the
positive trend, because as consumers we are interested in the services
we get from the raw materials rather than the raw materials themselves.
And we have learned to use less of given raw materials for given pur-
poses, as well as to substitute cheaper materials to get the same
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services, all of which makes raw material services even less scarce
than Figures 3-8 suggest. Consider a long-ago copper pot for cooking.
The consumer is interested in a container which can be put over the heat.
After iron and aluminum were discovered, quite satisfactory cooking
pots—almost as good as, or perhaps better than, pots of copper—can
be made of these materials. The cost that interests us is the cost of
providing the cooking service
,
rather than the cost of copper. If copper
were used only for cooking pots, and if iron can be used quite satisfac-
torily for the purpose, it would not matter if the cost of copper rose
sky high, as long as we had cheap iron.
A dramatic example of how the service that copper renders can
be supplied much more cheaply by a substitute process: A single com-
munications satellite in space provides intercontinental telephone
connections that would otherwise require 100,000 tons of copper.
Statement : Energy is getting scarcer.
Fact : The facts about the cost of energy are much the same as
the facts about other raw materials, as Figures 5 and 8 show. The new
strength of the OPEC cartel to control oil price obscures the cost of
production. But the production cost of a barrel of oil has not risen, and
probably has fallen, in deflated dollars even since the most recent "oil
crisis" came onto the scene in 1973—still $.05 to $.15 per barrel in the
Persian Gulf, which is perhaps a hundredth of the market price. (41) It
is reasonable to expect that eventually the price of oil will again return
nearer its economic cost of production, and the long-run downward trend in
the price of oil, as seen in Figures 5 and 8, will resume its course.
The price of electricity is an interesting measure of the consumer
cost of energy, and it is largely unaffected by cartels and politics
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(though the price of electricity did rise post-1973 because all energy
sources, including coal and uranium, jumped in price when the price
of oil went up, due to the improved market power of coal and uranium
suppliers). In Figure 9 we see that the long-run cost of electricity
clearly has been downward.
In short, the data show that energy has not been getting scarcer
in basic economic terms, but rather has been getting more plentiful.
Statement ; The supplies of natural resources are finite. This
apparently self-evident propostion is the starting point and the all-
determining assumption of such models as The Limits to Growth and much
popular discussion.
Fact : Incredible as it may seem at first, the term "finite" is
not only inappropriate but is downright misleading in the context of
natural resources, from both the practical and philosophical points of
view. As with so many of the important arguments in this world, this
one is "just semantic." Yet the semantics of resource scarcity muddle
public discussion and brings about wrong-headed policy decisions.
A definition of resource quantity must be operational to be useful.
It must tell us how the quantity of the resource that might be available
in the future could be calculated. But the future quantities of a
natural resource such as copper cannot be calculated even in principle
,
because of new lodes, new methods of mining copper, variations
in grades of copper lodes; because copper can be made from other metals;
and because of the vagueness of the boundaries within which copper might
be found—including the sea, and other planets. Even less possible is
a reasonable calculation of the amount of future services of the sort
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that we are now accustomed to get from copper, because of recycling and
because of the substitution of other materials for copper, as in the case
of the communications satellite.
Even the total weight of the earth is not a theoretical limit to
the amount of copper that might be available to earthlings in the future.
Only the total weight of the universe—if that term has a useful meaning
here—would be such a theoretical limit, and I don't think anyone would
like to argue the meaningfulness of "finite" in that context.
With respect to energy, it is particularly obvious that the earth
does not bound the quantity available to us; our sun (and perhaps other
suns) is our basic source of energy in the long run, from vegetation
(including fossilized vegetation) as well as from solar energy.
As to the practical finiteness and scarcity of resources—that
by these measures
bring us back to cost and price, and /history shows progressively de-
creasing rather than increasing scarcity.
Why does the word "finite" catch us up? That is an interesting
question in psychology, education, and philosophy; unfortunately there
is no space to explore it here.
In summary, because we find new lodes, invent better production
methods, and discover new substitutes, the ultimate constraint upon
our capacity to enjoy unlimited raw materials at acceptable prices is
knowledge. And the source of knowledge is the human mind. Ultimately,
then, the key constraint is human imagination and the exercise of
educated skills. Hence an increase of human beings constitutes an addi-
tion to the crucial stock of resources, along with causing additional
consumption of resources.
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Statement ; The old trends no longer apply. We are at a moment
of discontinuity now.
Fact : One cannot logically dispute assertions about present or
impending discontinuity. And one can find mathematical techniques
suggesting discontinuities that will be consistent with any trend data.
To illustrate this point, my co-worker Douglas Love fitted third-degree
polynomials to the price data for copper, wheat, and oil. Figures 10-12
seem to imply an upward tendency for all these prices.
My own judgment is that the long-run monotonic trends in Figures
3-8 are the more meaningful, but this is only one person's judgment.
We can say scientifically, however, that if in the past' one had acted
on the belief that the long-run price trend was upwards rather than
downwards, one would have lost money on the average.
When a person feels that another person is talking without taking
responsibility for the results, he says, "Put your money where your
mouth is". I'm prepared to take the consequences of my words. This is
a public offer to stake $10,000, in separate transactions of $1000 or
$100 each, on my belief that the cost of non-government-controlled raw
materials (including grains and oil) will not rise in the long run. If
you will pay me the current market price of $1000 or $100 worth of any
standard mineral or other extractive product you name, and specify any date
more than a year away, I will contract to pay you the then-current market
price of the material—a standard commodity-market agreement. How about
it, doomsayers and catastrophists? First come, first served.
Statement ; The Nation's "overall environmental well-being" is
declining, according to the Environmental Quality Index.
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Fact : This widely-reported "index" is, according to the National
Wildlife Federation which prepares and disseminates it, "a subjective
analysis . . . judgment [which] represents collective thinking of the
editors of the National Wildlife Federation Staff." That is, the EQI
represents casual observation rather than hard statistical facts. It
includes such subjective judgments as that the trend of "living space" is
"down . . . vast stretches of America are lost to development yearly." (42)
Yet the objective statistical facts indicate that the environment
is getting better. Earlier we saw that "living space" is not declining,
and recreational areas are increasing rapidly. The official Council on
Environmental Quality's data on major air pollutants show sharp improve-
ments in the last decade (Figure 13). With respect to water, "major
improvements in the quality of polluted streams have been documented"
with hard data, says the Council. (43) (See Figure 14.) The fish catch
in Lake Erie, long ago said to be "dead" by Barry Commoner, has been
increasing. The most important indicator of environmental quality is
life expectancy; it continues to rise—and at increasing rate: a gain
of 2.1 years from 1970-1976, compared to a gain of only 0.8 years in the
entire decade of the 1960's. (44)
Statement : Increased population density leads to psychological
and social pathology.
Fact : The statement is sheer myth, based on faulty analogies to
animal behavior. Social surveys show that density has no general ill
effects on such measures of welfare as longevity of life, crime rate,
mental illness rates, and recreational facilities. (45)
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The most ambitious experimental tests, by psychologist Jonathan
Freedman who started out as an associate of Paul Ehrlich believing that
density is pathological, found that though "Everyone knows that crowd-
ing is bad . . . Intuitions, speculations, political and philosophical
theory appear to be wrong in this respect . . . People who live under
crowded conditions do not suffer from being crowded. Other things being
equal, they are no worse off than other people ... It took me and other
psychologists working in this area many years to be convinced, but
eventually the weight of the evidence overcame our doubts and preconcep-
tions." (46)
Statement : Bringing immigrants from a poor country into a rich
country is an act of generous charity which throws citizens out of jobs,
and drains welfare and social service funds.
Fact ; Studies of the United Kingdom, Canada and the U.S. show that
immigrants put more into the tax coffers than they take out, while there
is no evidence that they increase overall unemployment rates. (47) Illegal
immigrants from Mexico and elsewhere are the best deal of all for the
U.S. taxpayers. Two California experiments show that few U.S. citizens
will take the jobs that illegal Mexican immigrants fill. And while the
illegals are in the U.S., three-fourths pay Social Security and income
taxes through payroll deductions. (48) But lack of citizenship prevents
illegals from getting most social benefits even though they pay taxes;
less than 5% use public hospital services, collect any unemployment
insurance, or have children in school; and, perhaps one percent get food
stamps or welfare payments. (49) Villalpando calculated a ratio of $24
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in taxes paid by illegals for each $1 of social services used in San Diego
County. (50)
Statement : In 1972 the Club of Rome asserted that economic and
population growth must cease, and disaster from resource exhaustion is
imminent.
Fact : In 1976 the Club of Rome "reversed its position" and "came
out for more growth."
The Club's founder, Italian Industrialist Aurelio
Peccei, says that Limits was intended to jolt people
from the comfortable idea that present growth trends
could continue indefinitely. That done, he says, the
Club could then seek ways to close the widening gap
between rich and poor nations—inequities that, if they
continue, could all too easily lead to famine, pollution
and war. The Club's startling shift, Peccei says, is thus
not so much a turnabout as part of an evolving strategy. (51)
In other words, the Club of Rome sponsored and disseminated untruths
In an attempt to scare us. Now having scared us by lying to us, the
Club of Rome can tell people the real truth that we are now ready to
hear.
Of course it is possible that the Club of Rome did not really
practice the deceitful "evolving strategy" that is now says it did.
Maybe they simply realized at last that the 1972 Limits to Growth study
was scientifically worthless. If so, the Club of Rome is now lying about
what it really did, in order to save face. From the outside we have no
way of knowing which of these ugly possible untruths is the real "truth".
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Surely this is one of the more curious scientific episodes of
recent years. Those who wrote The Limits to Growth study have not
recanted, to my knowledge, even though their sponsors have. But neither
did the writers confront and contradict their sponsors when the sponsors
recanted. The whole matter seems to have passed with little notice,
and The Limits to Growth continues to be cited as an authority—though
it has been damned as foolishness or fraud by almost every reviewer
including a forceful early editorial in Science . (52) If the shoe were
on the other foot, we would surely hear plenty from such organizations
as ZPG.
Another curios .um: The Club of Rome continues to sponsor research
reports which it expects people to accept as valid science—and it finds
researchers to accept Club of Rome support.
Statement ; "[E]ven if the family size drops gradually—to the
two-child average—there will be no year in the next two decades in which
the absolute number of births will be less than in 1970," said the
President's Commission on Population Growth, 1972. (53)
Fact ; In 1971—the year before this forecast by the President's
Commission was transmitted to the President and then published—the
absolute number of births (not the birth rate) was less than in 1970.
By 1975, the absolute number of births was barely higher than in 1920,
and the number of white births was actually lower than in most years
from 1914 to 1924.
This scientific fiasco shows how flimsy are the demographic fore-
casts upon which arguments about growth policy are based. In this case
the Commission did not even backcast correctly, let alone forecast well.
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Another peculiar forecasting episode: Between 1969 and 1978, UN
and other standard estimates of the world's population in the year 2000
fell from around 7.5 billion to around 5.5 billion. This is a difference
of two billion people—equal to about half the world's present population
—
for a date only thirty years or less in the future.
There is also grave disagreement even among estimates of current
magnitudes. An important example is the population growth rate of China
—
a fifth of the entire world population: 2.4% per year according to
the Environmental Fund, and 0.8% per year according to USAID; these esti-
mates correspond to doubling times of about 30 years and about 90 years,
respectively, estimates with entirely different implications. (54)
WHY DO WE HEAR PHONEY BAD NEWS?
Why do false statements of bad news dominate public discussion of
these topics? Here are some speculations:
(1) There is a funding incentive for scholars and institutions
to produce bad news about population, resources, and the environment.
USAID and the UN's Fund for Population Activities disburse hundreds of
millions of dollars each year to bring about fertility decline. Much
of this money goes to studies and publications that show why fertility
decline is a good thing. There are no organizations that fund studies
having the opposite aim. It should be no surprise, then, when an organi-
zation such as Worldwatch Institute—whose statement of purpose is "to
identify and to focus attention on global problems", and which gets support
from AID and the UNFPA—"identifies" impending disasters whether backed
by statistical evidence or not.
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(2) Bad news sells books, newspapers and magazines; good news is
not half so interesting. Is it a wonder that there are lots of bad-news
bestsellers warning about pollution, population growth and natural-
resource depletion, but none telling us the facts about improvement?
(3) Pure individual selfishness is another reason for spreading
bad news. For example, in the short run more children mean more visitors
to wild-life areas, and it makes sense in terms of Daniel Boone-like
self-interest for the Environmental Fund and related organizations to
try to convince people that population growth is a bad thing— though
in the long run a larger population may well build and protect new and
better recreation areas.
(4) There are a host of possible psychological explanations for
this phenomenon about which I am reluctant to speculate. But these two
people
seem reasonably sure: (a) Many/have a propensity to compare the present
and the future with an ideal state of affairs rather than with the past
or with some other feasible state; the present and future inevitably
. nature of
look bad in such a comparison. (b) The accumulative/ exponential
growth models has the power to seduce and bewitch.
(5) Some publicize dire predictions in the idealistic belief that
such warnings can mobilize institutions and individuals to make things
even better, figuring that nothing bad can come of them. But we should
not shrug off false bad news as harmless exaggeration. The piper will
be paid—in loss of credibility for real threats as they arise, because
of the "wolf" cries, and in loss of public trust in debased public communi-
cation. As Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Science
testified to Congressmen in the midst of the environmental panic in 1970:
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"The nations of the world may yet pay a dreadful price for the public
behavior of scientists who depart from . . . fact to indulge ... in
hyperbole. (55)
The question, then, is: Who will tell us the good-and-true-news?
How will it be published for people to learn?
POSTSCRIPT ABOUT VALUES
Personal values heavily influence attitudes about population and
resources. Many of those who are most outspoken on these subjects implicitly
or explicitly hold the value that more people are not a good thing in and
of themselves. They are downright gleeful at the notion that billions
of human lives will never be lived that might be lived. An example is
this statement in a mass-circulation magazine by X, one of the world's great
demographers, when referring to the 23 million person increase in the U.S.
during the 1960's: "I have never been able to get anyone to tell me why
we needed those 23 million." (56) Paul Ehrlich expressed the same idea:
"I can't think of any reason for having more than one hundred fifty million
people (in the U.S.), and no one has ever raised one to me." (57)
Gentlemen, may I be the first to suggest a few reasons? Least-
interesting but not unimportant is that a larger population now probably
means a better standard of living for our grandchildren and great-grand-
children. A more interesting reason that Ehrlich and X have not discovered
is that "we"—whoever "we" is—need another person for the same reasons
"we" need X and Ehrlich. That is, just as the Ehrlichs are of value
to the rest of us, just so will the average "additional" person born be
of value to the rest of us.
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The most interesting reason for additional people, however, is that
if the Ehrlichs say that their lives are of value to themselves—and
if the rest of us honor that claim and say that human life is of value
for its own sake—then in the same manner the lives of additional people
are of value to those additional people, and hence to the rest of us.
If Ehrlich or X were to ask those 23 million Americans born
between 1960 and 1970 whether it was a good thing that they were born,
many of them would be able to think of a reason or two. Some of them
might also be unkind enough to add: "Yes, it's true that you gentlemen
do not personally need any of jos_ for your welfare. But then, gentle-
men, do you think that we have greater need of you for our welfare?"
What is most astonishing is that these simple ideas—which would
immediately spring to the mind of many people who have not been to
school—have never even come into the heads of famous scientists such
as Ehrlich, by their own admission! But the Ehrlichs have access to
the media, and the will to use it. Who will express other values and
points of view? Will it take a catastrophe to bring them forth?
M/D/126

SUMMARY
False bad news about population growth, natural resources, and
the environment is published widely in the face of solid contradictory
evidence. For example, the world supply of arable land has been in-
creasing, the scarcity of natural resources including food and energy
has been decreasing, and basic measures of U.S. environmental quality
have positive trends. The aggregate data show no long run negative
effect of population growth upon the standard of living, and my models
that embody forces omitted in the past—especially the influence of
population size upon productivity increase—suggest a long run positive
effect. There are various possible reasons why the false bad news dom-
inates the true good news. Personal values are certainly a key factor.
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Julian L. Simon
Per-Capita Food Production in the World
1948 -1976
World World
Excluding Including
Mainland China Mainland China Combined Index
(1952-1956=100) (1961-1965=100) (1948-1952=100)
Year (1) (2) (From 1 and 2)
1948-1952 93 100
1952 97 104
1953 100 108
1954 99 106
1955 101 109
1956 103 111
1957 102 110
1958 106 114
1959 106 114
1960 107 115
1961 106 114
1962 108 116
1963 108 116
1964 109 102 118
1965 108 100 116
1966 111 103 119
1967 113 105 121
1968 106 123
1969 105 119
1970
——
-
- -. i
106 123

uuij.au i_i • J xuiuil
Year (1) (2) (From 1 and 2)
1971 107 125
1972 104 120
1973 108 126
1974 107 125
1975 108 126
1976 110 128
Sources: United Nations FAO Production Yearbook , 1968, 1975, 1976.
TABLE 2

35
-r
30
h 25
%
w
d<
wH
.3 20--
o
H
P
& 15-
o
10 •-
5--
SWEDEN
1861-69
to
1963-67
JAPAN
1874-79
to
1963-67
NORWAY
9 DENMARK
1865" 69
ft 1865-69 to
FRANCE
t° 1963-67
1963 67 GERMANY
•
* 1850-59
1861-70 to
to 1963-67
1963-67
GREAT BRITAIN
• NETHERLANDS
1855-64 •
to 1860-70
1963-67 to
1963-67
CANADA
U.S.
1870-74 to 1963-67
1859
to
1963-67
AUSTRALIA
9
1861-69
to
1963-67
10 15 20 A
POPULATION GROWTH RATE PER DECADE
POPULATION GROWTH AND OUTPUT GROWTH OVER A CENTURY IN
CONTEMPORARY MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
FIG. la
SOURCE: (22)

25
ITALY
1895-99
to
1963-67
20 -
FRANCE
GERMANY
1910-13
to
1963-67
CANADA
•
1920-24
to
1963-67
1896
to V^K.
1963-6
<HH
%U
Pi
w
wH
ss
E3
a
H3
3O
15 "
10 --
1920-24
to
1963-67
BELGIUM
SWITZERLAND
o
1910
to
1963-67
1900-04
to
1963-67
U.S.
o
1910-14
to
1963-67
NETHERLANDS
•
1900-09
to
1963-67 AUSTRALIAQ
1900-04
to
1963-67
5 --
5 10 15
POPULATION GROWTH RATE PER DECADE
POPULATION GROWTH AND OUTPUT GROWTH OVER HALF A CENTURY
IN CONTEMPORARY MORE-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
FIG. lb
20
Source: (23)

.Julian l,. simon
TABLE 3
MONIES OBLIGATED (LOANS AND DISBURSEMENTS) FOR
HEALTH AND POPULATION PROGRAMS BY THE AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(in millions of U.S. dollars), 1965-1977
Fiscal Year Population
1965 1.9
1966 3.8
1967 4.3
1968 34.4
1969 43.9
1970 73.1
1971 94.0
1972 120.9
1973 121.7
1974 100.1
1975 100.0
1976 103.0
1977 (Est.) 143.4
Health Total
32.4
58.7
98.1
131.3
38.3
37.1
57.7
35.4
42.9
81.5
54.5
54.4
93.6
34.3
62.5
102.4
165.7
82.0
110.2
151.7
156.3
164.6
181.6
154.5
157.4
237.0
Source: Lois E. Bradshaw, Don Pitty, and Cynthia P. Green, "A Guide
to Sources of Family Planning Program Assistance," Population
Reports , Series J, March, 1977, p. J272.
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Figure 2. Schematic of MDC Model; (Two Versions)
A = level of technology in year t
K = capital
L = labor
Y. = national income
Note: The model is run for 160 periods, the output from each year t becoming the input
for year t+1. The line with long dashes from L to A represents a version of the model
in which the size of the labor force directly influences the level of technology through
the quantity of inventions and adaptations. The line with the short dashes represents a
version indirectly embodying a similar effect simulated by way of the effect of the size
of the market on increases in productivity.
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FIGURE 13 Overall national trends in daily observed levels of siilf"'
dioxide and total suspended particulates.
Reproduced from Council on Environmental Quality, Seventh Annual Reportx
1976, p. 226, from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency data.

Figure 14
Summary of Water Quality Observations Related to
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Reproduced from Council on Environmental Quality, Sixth Annual Report-
1975, p. 352, from U.S. Geological Survey data.





